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CIVIL RIGHTS-No Hitting Back: Schools Have to Play by the Title IX
Rules; Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
Elisa M Butler*
INTRODUCTION

The Birmingham Board of Education hired Roderick Jackson in 1993 to
teach physical education and to coach a girls basketball team.' Six years later, in
1999, Jackson transferred to Ensley High School. Not long after his transfer,
Jackson identified disparate treatment between the boys and girls basketball teams
in terms of access to equipment and facilities. 3 He also alleged that the girls team
was receiving less funding than the boys.4 In December 2000, Jackson complained
to his superior about the unequal treatment, but did not receive a response, and
the disparity in treatment continued.5 Jackson persisted in advocating for the
equal treatment of the girls basketball team, but his complaints went unheeded.6
Subsequently, Jackson received negative work evaluations, and was ultimately
dismissed as the girls basketball coach in May 2001.' At that time in his career,
Jackson had taught and coached for the Birmingham School District for eight
years.' Although he was dismissed from coaching, Jackson continued to teach
physical education for the duration of his case.'
After dismissal from his coaching duties, Jackson filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama claiming a violation
of his civil rights based on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972."°
He claimed that the school board violated Title IX by retaliating against him for
protesting the unequal treatment of the girls basketball teams." The school board,
however, argued that there was no Title IX private cause of action for third-party

*University of Wyoming College of Law J.D. Candidate, 2008.
'Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005).
2

Id.

3Id.
4Id.

5Id.
6

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.

1 Id. at 171-72.
8

See id. at 171.

9

Id. at 172.
10Id.; see also Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§§

1681-1688

(2006).
" Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.
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The district court agreed and granted the board's motion to

Jackson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which also
sided with the school board."4 It reasoned that Congress did not expressly create a
private right of action when it enacted the statute, and the court would not imply
one.15 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the question and, in a
5-4 decision, reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding. 6
This note will generally examine private rights of action implied by the courts,
and contend that the Supreme Court correctly decided Jackson v. Birmingham
Board of Education when it held that Title IX implies a private cause of action
for third-party retaliation claims. This note will scrutinize the Court's decision in
Jackson, and after extensive analysis, illustrate that the Court's holding in Jackson
was ultimately correct. Furthermore, this note will consider some of implications
that this decision has on Title IX as well as other statutes.
BACKGROUND

Title IX states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 17 Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to
its Spending Clause power, and "patterned [it] after Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.""1 Title IX's purpose is to address issues involving discrimination on
the basis of sex that are not covered by Title VI or VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'" Title IX is pervasive in its application "appl[ying] to virtually all public
and private educational institutions, and includ[ing] all institutional operations
such as academic programs or athletics. 20

12Id.

13Id.
MJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (1 1th Cit. 2002).
15Id. at 1345.

'6Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 184 (2005).
'7Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
" Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979); see also Bradford C. Mank, Are AntiRetaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX Enforceable in a Private Right ofAction: Does Sandoval
or Sullivan Controlthis Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47, 59 (2004).
'9 See Mank, supranote 18, at 60.
20 Id. at 60.
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Title IX was introduced to Congress for debate in 1972.21 While this was the
first time this bill was introduced, the idea of equality in education dates back to
the late 1960s.22 By the summer of 1970, Congress began focusing on sex bias in
education with hearings before a special House subcommittee.23 Subsequently,
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana introduced Title IX in 1972.24 Senator Bayh stated
that the bill's purpose was to battle "the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women in the American educational system. '25 He stressed
that inequities in education often lead to inequities in employment opportunities. 26 Although the House and the Senate seemed to agree that there was a need
for change, there were difficulties in passing this bill.2 7 Many members of Congress
28
feared that passage of the statute would lead to reverse discrimination and quotas.
Senator Bayh stressed, however, that "the amendment is not designed to require
29
specific quotas. The thrust of the amendment is to do away with every quota.
Congress finally agreed when the House attached a floor amendment to the bill
stipulating that quotas would not be required.3 ' The newly-clarified legislation
was enacted as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.31
The result of the debate in Congress over the specifics of Title IX was a broadly
worded statute patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 Because
this statute was worded so broadly, Congress left the task of interpreting the statute
and creating regulations to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

21

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS

Div.,

TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL

17 (Jan. 11,

2001),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/ixegal.htm [hereinafter TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL].
22Id.at 16-17. The emphasis on sex discrimination occurred during the civil rights movement.
Id. at 16. During this time, people began noticing the disparate treatment and earning gaps occurring between males and females. Id. Consequently, the focus shifted toward inequities in education,
which had inhibited the progress of women. Id. Advocacy groups began speaking out and filed
class action lawsuits because of an "industry-wide pattern of sex bias against women who worked in
colleges and universities." Id.
23 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 16; see also Sex Discrimination Regulations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the PostsecondaryEduc. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th
Cong. (1975).
24 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 17.
25

118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).

26 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL,

supra note 21, at 17.

27

Id.at 18.

28

Id.

29

117 CONG. REC. 30,409 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh).

30 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL,

supra note 21, at 18.

3'Id.at 19.
32 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,858 (Aug. 30, 2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. part
54); see also TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 8.
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(HEW). 33 The HEW subsequently adopted a multitude of guidelines to create
a framework for the application of Title IX to education programs. 34 Following
the agency adoption of these regulations, Congress was given the opportunity to
review them to determine whether they were consistent with Congress' intent in
enacting Title IX.35 Although there were some disputes in Congress as to whether
the regulations should be disapproved in whole or in part, ultimately Congress
36
opted not to disapprove the regulations at all.
In 1980, the HEW split into two distinct departments, the Department of
Education and the Department of Health and Human Services.37 The regulations
of the HEW were adopted by both departments. 38 As additional protection, in
1980, President Jimmy Carter enacted Executive Order 12,250 which created
power in the Attorney General to provide leadership for the "consistent and
39
effective implementation" of various civil rights statutes, including Title IX.
Because the Attorney General is the head of the U.S. Department of Justice,
the agency was also charged with enacting rules for the application of Title IX.40
The Department of Justice did not use this power until 1999 when it published
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement Title IX.4 The rules eventually adopted by the Department of Justice are virtually identical to both HEW
and Department of Education regulations.4 2 The only changes made to the old
13TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 23; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at
52,859.
3' See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.ER § 86 (2006); see also TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21,
at 23; and Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 52,859.
31 David S. Cohen, Title IX, Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 217, 246-47
(2005). The case of INS v. Chadha creates questions as to whether this process is constitutional. See
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). But this process is important, in this case, because it illustrates
legislative intent.
36 See Cohen, supra note 35, at 247. These regulations, approved by Congress included a

regulation against retaliation. See 34 C.ER. § 106.71 (2006) (incorporating Title VI regulation
prohibiting retaliation, 34 C.ER. § 100.7(e) (2006)).
37 TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 23; see also Melanie J. Perez, Note, Protecting
All Victims? The Rise ofRetaliation Claims Under Title IX ofthe EducationAmendments of 1972, 57
RUTGERS L. REv. 1145, 1150-51 (2005).
3s See 34 C.ER. §§ 106-106.71 (2006) and 45 C.ER. 9% 86-86.71 (2006); see also TITLE IX
LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 23. Some of the regulations adopted by the HEW include prohibi-

tions of discrimination of the basis of sex in housing, facilities, access to course offerings, counseling,
financial assistance, health insurance benefits, athletics, etc. See 45 C.ER. %§ 86.32-86.41 (2006).
" Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980).
40 See id.
41See TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL,
42

supra note 21, at 23.

Id. at 23-24; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or

Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,859 (Aug. 30, 2000).
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regulations reflect statutory revisions and "modifications to ensure consistency
43
with Supreme Court precedent.
Title IX's application is quite broad.44 This breadth is shown by the regulations promulgated by the agencies charged with its interpretation: they "appl[y]
to all aspects of education programs or activities operated by recipients of federal
financial assistance."45 Title IX also applies to a broad spectrum of activities occurring within educational programs. 46 It prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex in housing, access to course offerings, access to schools, counseling, financial
assistance, health and insurance benefits, and athletics.4 7 Title IX also prohibits
48
educational programs from discriminating in employment practices.
Not only is Title IX broadly applied to activities within education programs,
but it also broadly defines educational programs receiving federal financial assistance. 49 Title IX applies to educational programs that receive federal financial aid
through direct means, such as grants or loans applied directly to the institution.50
It also applies to educational programs that receive financial assistance indirectly,
such as through federal grants and loans given to students who, in turn, use these
to pay the institution that they attend.5' Although the agencies did not explicitly
spell out that educational programs would be forced to comply with Title IX if
they received federal financial assistance through indirect means, the Supreme
Court ruled that this was the case in 1984.52 In Grove City College v. Bell, the

13TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 24; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at

52,859.
" See, e.g., TITLE IX LEGAL
45Id. at 7.
46
Id.at 7-8.

MANUAL,

supra note 21, at 25-55.

17Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 52,871-72; see also TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at
85-93.
48 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal

Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 52,873-74; see also TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at

73-75.
'9See,

e.g.,
TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 25.

50 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving

Federal Financial Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 52,866; see also TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note
21, at 26.
51TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 30.
52 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984) (overruled on another point of law by

the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987). The Court looked at the legislative history of Title IX and
determined that Congress intended for the statute to cover those institutions that receive assistance
indirectly. Id. at 569-70.
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Court ruled that it did not matter that the college did not receive federal financial
aid directly from the government; it would still be required to comply with Title
53
IX because it received funds indirectly.
In Grove City College, the Court determined that Congress intended educational programs that receive federal financial assistance, either directly or indirectly, to be under Title IX's thumb. The Court, however, tempered this ruling
by finding that the entire educational institution could not be sanctioned for
refusing to follow Title IX-only the part of the institution that was receiving
federal financial assistance was required to comply.54 This ruling seemed to narrow the scope of Title IX and how it could be applied to educational programs.
Congress, however, again widened the scope of Title IX by amending the
statute with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ("CRRA") after the Court's
Grove City decision.55 Congress intended the CRRA to establish the "principle
of institution-wide coverage" for Title IX.5 6 Therefore, if part of an educational
institution receives federal financial assistance either directly or indirectly, it will be
required to follow Title IX throughout the entire institution. This statute directly
overruled the Court's holding in Grove City College5 7 Although this widened the
scope of Title IX once again, it is important to note that Title IX only reaches
educational programs.58 Therefore, if part of an institution is educational and part
is not, sanctions for violating Title IX could not be applied to the non-educational
portion of the institution. 59 While Title IX only applies to educational programs,
its reach is broad within this area. As shown, this is exactly what Congress
intended. 60 Title IX was deliberately enacted to reach into the farthest corner of
61
education to remedy discrimination on the basis of sex.

13 Id. at 563-70. The college was receiving federal financial assistance indirectly because students who attended the college were given federal grants which were used to pay tuition, fees, and
room and board. Id. at 559.

51 Id. at 573.

55TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 49; see also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
56
TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 49.
57 If this case were decided after the CRRA was enacted the Court would be required to find
that the entire college would be subject to sanctions because part of the college was receiving federal
financial assistance indirectly. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); see also Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006).
58

TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL,

supra note 21, at 49.

59Id.
60 See supra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
61 See supra

notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
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As a result of congressional intent to continually broaden Title IX, courts
have consistently interpreted the statute very broadly.62 In fact, the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]here is no doubt that 'if we are to give [Title IX] the scope
that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.' 63 As
part of this broad scope, the Court interpreted Title IX to imply private rights
of actions.64 It also broadly interpreted Title IX to apply to employees as well
as students. 65 Finally, the Court allowed monetary awards when intentional discrimination occurs in violation of Title IX. 66 The Court's history illustrates the
broad reach extended in this statute.
Because Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education rests on the question of
whether a private right of action should be implied for claims of third-party retaliation under Title IX, Sullivan v. Little HuntingPark, Inc. is an important case to
discuss. Sullivan signaled the first time the Court implied a private right of action
for retaliation.6 7 Sullivan was a white man who leased his home to Freeman, an
African-American man.68 Along with the rental, Sullivan assigned Freeman the
right to use the community recreational facilities.69 The community park board of
7
directors rejected Sullivan's assignment because Freeman was African-American.
Subsequently, Sullivan protested the board's refusal. 7' The board then told Sullivan
that it was expelling him from the corporation.72 Sullivan sued the board, claiming
that it illegally retaliated against him. 73 The Supreme Court reasoned that if this
retaliation were allowed to stand, it would "give impetus to the perpetuation of
racial restrictions on property. '74 Sullivan, therefore, had a private right of action
62 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County

Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); andNorth Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
63 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
6 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (holding that there is a private right
of action for Title IX violations).
65 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 520 (holding that Title IX applies to employees as well as
students).
6 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that monetary
damages are available for intentional Title IX violations).
67Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). This case was not a Title IX case.
It is similar to Jackson, however, because it was based on a statute protecting a certain class of people.
See id at 234-35. Similar to Jackson, Sullivan was a member of the non-protected class advocating
for the rights of a person in the protected class, and was subsequently retaliated against. See id.
68 Id. at 235.
69 Id.

70Id.
71 Id.
72 Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235.

71 Id. Sullivan sued the board under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 which provides, "All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Id.
71Id. at 237.
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because "the white owner is at times 'the only adversary' of the unlawful restrictive
covenant." 75 This is an important case because it provides the legal context in
76
which Title IX was passed.
Not only is the legal context in which the statute was passed important to
understand, it is also important to explore established Supreme Court tests that
deal with similar issues. Cort v. Ash provided just such a test. This case established
a four-part test to determine whether courts should imply a private right of action
when Congress has not explicitly provided for one. 77 A corporate director had
misused corporate funds.78 Ash, a shareholder, sued under a federal statute that
"provide[d] only for a criminal penalty." 79 The Court was compelled to deter8°
mine whether to imply a private cause of action under the statute. The Court
pronounced four relevant factors: (1) whether "the plaintiff [is] one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted;"' (2) whether "there [is] any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one;" (3) whether "it [is] consistent with the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff;" and (4) whether
"the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law ... so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law."'" While
it articulated these factors, the Court refused to imply a private right of action in
Cort because that would mean intruding "into an area traditionally committed to
to use this test to
state law."'8 2 Although Ash failed in this case, courts continue
83
statutes.
other
under
exist
action
of
rights
private
that
find
While the Court articulated a test concerning private rights of action, it was
8
not until Cannon v. University of Chicago that it was applied to Title IX." The
71Id.

(quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953) (holding a restrictive covenant

preventing African-Americans from buying property in a neighborhood valid as long as it was

agreed to voluntarily)).
76Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969);Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176-77.
77Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
71Id. at 70-73.
79

Id. at 71; see also Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (2006).
U.S. at 74.

80 Cort, 422

81Id. at

77-78 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).

82 Cort, 422

U.S. at 85. With this factor, the Court is inquiring as to whether a federalism

problem would arise ifa private right of action were implied. See id.
13 See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293-95 (1981) (holding that a private right
of action should not be implied because the plaintiff failed the first factor of the Cort test); see also
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979) (holding that a private right of action
exists because the plaintiff met all four factors of the Cort test); andPiper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977) (holding that a private right of action should not be implied because the
plaintiff failed the first factor of the Cort test); andReeves v. Cont'l Equities Corp. of America, 912
F.2d 37, 40 (1990) (holding that a private right of action should not be implied because the plaintiff

failed the first two factors of the Cort test).

" Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss2/8
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85
University of Chicago Medical School denied admission to Geraldine Cannon.
She maintained the University's rejection was based on her sex and sued, claiming
that the school's denial violated her rights under Title IX.8 6 In allowing a private
87
action, the Court relied heavily on the four-part test articulated in Cort v. Ash.
Cannon satisfied the first prong because the statute protects those participating
in or attempting to participate in federally-funded education programs, and
the University of Chicago Medical School was a federally-funded educational
program.88

For the second prong, the Court analogized Title IX to Title VI claims, in
89
which it had already implied a private right of action for racial discrimination.
Title IX was "patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and, at
the time, the federal courts had already developed a private right of action under
Title VI.9° Therefore, Congress would assume Title IX would be "interpreted and
applied as Title VI had been during the previous eight years." 9'
Cannon satisfied the third prong, as well.9 Title IX has two purposes. The
first is to "avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices." 93
The second is to "provide individual citizens effective protection against those
'
practices."94
The first purpose is satisfied by federal procedures which may terminate funds if institutions discriminate. 95 But this protection does not completely
fulfill the second purpose of the statute. 96 Terminating federal funding is often
a punishment that is too severe. 97 Therefore, a more appropriate remedy for
discrimination on an individual basis would be a private right of action against
the institution.98 According to the Court, "it makes little sense to impose on an
'5Id.at 680.
86Id.
87Cort v. Ash,
88

422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693-94.

89Id.

at 694-95; Title VI is identical to Title IX except instead of "on the basis of sex" in Title

IX, Title VI uses the language "on ground of race, color, or national origin." Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). The second prong of the Cort test considers whether
there is a legislative intent to create the remedy in question. Cort v.Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
90

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96; see also Bossier Parish Sch. v. Lemon, 370 E2d 847, 852 (5th

Cit. 1967) (implying a private right of action for Title VI claims).
91 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696.
92Id.at 704-05. The third prong of the Cort test considers whether the remedy in question is
consistent with the purpose of the legislative scheme. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
93Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
94Id.

95Id.
96

Id. at 705.

97Id.
98

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
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individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself,
the burden
of demonstrating that an institution's practices are so pervasively discriminatory
that a complete cut-off of federal funding is appropriate."99 Requiring individuals
to prove this level of discrimination would create an enormous burden on both
the individual and the institution. 100
Cannon also satisfied the final prong. 1 Since the Civil War, the federal
government has traditionally been the shield against discrimination. 10 2 Protecting
citizens against discrimination is not a "subject matter [that] involves an area basically of concern to the States. ' 10 3 Therefore, a federalism problem did not arise
from implying a private right of action in federal anti-discrimination statutes.'
Since all four elements weighed in favor of implying a private right of action
under Title IX, the Court implied a private right of action for Cannon. 105
By implying a private right of action in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the
Court gave individuals an opportunity to challenge institutions' discriminatory
practices.'0 6 The Court provided this remedy without burdening victims with
the responsibility of proving such pervasive discrimination that it warranted
terminating federal funds. 1 7 This decision also allowed individuals an opportunity to protect themselves from discrimination rather than relying on the federal
government to threaten refusal of funding to educational institutions to gain
protection. 108
The Court went further in broadening the scope of Title IX with its decision
in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 0 9 This was the first case authorizing monetary damages for private Title IX actions."' The Court, however, limited
monetary recovery to individuals experiencing intentional Title IX violations.111

99Id.
100 See

id.

10' Id. at 708-09. The fourth prong of the Cort test considers whether the cause of action is

"traditionally relegated to state law." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
102 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708.
103

Id. at 708.

104
Id.
105Id. at
106

709

Id. at 705.

107 Cannon, 441
108

U.S. at 705.

Id.

109Franklin

v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Franklin involved a student's

allegation that she had been sexually harassed by a teacher. Id. at 63. The student reported the
harassment, but no action was taken against the teacher. Id.at 63-64.
"0 Id.at 76.
"1Id. at 74-75.
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First, the Franklin Court reiterated the Cannon private right of action for
Title IX violations.' 12 If a private action is available, the Court reasoned, a remedy
to cure the injustice must also be available." 3 Without a remedy there would be
no reason to bring suit.14 Although this reasoning alone was sufficient, the Court
buttressed its position with numerous cases finding a remedy available when a
right of action exists "under the Constitution or laws of the United States.""' 5
While the Supreme Court allowed monetary damages, it qualified its holding
by allowing recovery only in cases of intentional discrimination. 1 6 The Court
reasoned that when Congress enacts a statute under its spending power, as with
Title IX, the statute is "much in the nature of a contract."" 7 This means that
federal funds are distributed to institutions in consideration for their agreement
to the statutory conditions." 8 In the case of Title IX, the federal government
agreed to distribute federal funds to educational institutions on the condition that
these institutions not discriminate on the basis of sex. 19 Because this arrangement
is "much in the nature of a contract," Congress must clearly define the conditions
with which an institution must comply.120 An institution must be aware of the
funding conditions, so the Court cannot allow individuals to recover monetary
damages for unintentional discrimination.12 ' If discrimination is unintentional,
the receiving institution is not aware of the discrimination or of the fact that its
funding may be in jeopardy.'2 2 There is no notice problem, however, when the

112Id. at 65.
"I Id. at 66.

See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
15 Id.
at 66-67 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (finding that when there is a
right to sue, "federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done"); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222, 229 (1901) (reiterating "the principle that a liability created by statute
without a remedy may be enforced by common-law action"); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524, 624 (1838) (stating that it is a "monstrous absurdity in a well organized government,
that there should be no remedy although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (finding that laws should "furnish [a]
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right"); Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 19, 87 Eng. Rep. 808,
816 (Q.B. 1702) ("If a statute gives a right, the common law will give a remedy to maintain that
right ..
")).
116 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76.
14

117

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) cited in Franklin v.

Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992).
118Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75.
"' Id. at 75; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999).
120

Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 17 ("There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is

unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.").
121 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); and
Mank, supra note 18, at 68.
122Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74.
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discrimination is intentional because the discriminating entity is aware, and even
intends to discriminate. 21 3 Because entities receiving federal funds know that they
are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex, and because intentional
discrimination occurs when the entity knows that it is discriminating, the entity
12 4
cannot then say that it was not on notice that it could lose federal funding.
While both Cannon and Franklin broadened Title IX protection and its
remedies, the Court narrowed these protections in the case of Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District. 25 Gebser, like Franklin, was based on a high school
student's allegations that a teacher had sexually harassed her. 126 Unlike Franklin,
this student failed to report the harassment, though other students complained
that the teacher had acted similarly toward them. 127 As a result, the principal
28
apologized to the complaining students and parents for the teacher's behavior.
The principal did not, however, report the incident to the superintendent of the
29
school district. 1
The Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to monetary damages
under Title IX because the school district did not have actual notice of the
plaintiff's harassment, and the district should not be held liable for something
it was not aware of.'3 ' Again, the Court relied on the premise that congressional
legislation passed under the Spending Clause is a contract between the federal
government and funding recipients.' 3' Because this is a contract, Congress must
be unambiguous about the conditions placed upon these recipients. 3 2 The school
district, ignorant of the harassment, did not have adequate notice that it would
be liable for a Title IX action brought by this student. 133 The Court asserted that
because Title IX focused on protection rather than compensation, institutions are
not liable when they are not given the opportunity to remedy the situation. 34 In
Gebser, the school did not have an adequate opportunity to remedy the harassment

123See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,90 MiNN. L. REv. 18, 48-49 (2005) for a discussion of
intentional discrimination.
124

Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75.

125Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
126Id. at
27

1

Id.

128

Id.

129 Id. at

524 U.S. 274 (1998).

277-78.

278.

131

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285; see also 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights 5 168 (2006).
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.

132

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

'33

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287.

130

134 Id. The Court stated that "Title IX focuses more on 'protecting' individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds." Id.
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because it did not have notice of the incidents so it could not be held financially
35
responsible.
Although some of the previous cases explain how the Court has interpreted
Title IX, it is also important to understand how the Court has interpreted Title
VI because these statutes mirror one another.'36 Alexander v. Sandoval involved an
extensive analysis ofTitle VI regulations promulgated by the Department ofJustice
that prohibited disparate-impact discrimination.137 This case began in Alabama,
which had recently declared its official language as English.138 Because of this, the
Department of Public Safety administered driver's license tests only in English. 139
Sandoval, as a representative of the class opposing the regulation, argued that this
provision violated Title VI because it had the effect of discriminating against a
class of people based on their national origin. 4 ' The district court agreed with
Sandoval and enjoined the state from administering the tests in English only."14
42
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, reasoning that the
Department of Justice regulations forbade conduct that Title VI itself permitted. 4 3 Since Title VI permitted the conduct, the regulations were irrelevant to
determining whether a Title VI private cause of action should be implied in this
case. 144 The Court further stated that Congress is responsible for creating private
rights of action.145 Therefore, if Congress does not establish a private right of
' 46
action when writing a statute, "courts may not create one."'

Id.

135

136
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695 (1979).
'37Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S 275, 278 (2001). Title VI prohibits institutions receiving
federal funding from discriminating against individuals based on race, color, or national origin. Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
138Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79.

139
Id.
140Id. at 279. Sandoval represented a class of people who could not take the driver's license test

because they did not speak the English language. Id.
141Id.
142

Id.

143 Sandoval, 532

U.S. at 285. The Court stated that if a statute allows certain conduct, the

administrative agency charged with making rules under that statute cannot forbid the same conduct.
Id. In this case, the regulation forbade disparate treatment that resulted in discrimination on the
basis of race. Title VI, however, allowed such conduct. Id.
144Id. at 285.
141Id.at 286.
146 Id.at

286-87.
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The Court further analyzed whether section 602 of Title VI implies a private
right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under the agency's authority.1 47 The Court maintained that individuals could not sue to enforce regulations
promulgated under section 602 because the statute's language did not display a
"congressional intent to create new rights." 148 In contrast with allowing individuals
to sue, the agency already had an express provision provided in section 602 to terminate funding in discrimination cases. 49 Because Congress had already provided
the agency with a method to enforce the statute, this suggested that Congress
intended to exclude others.150 In Justice Scalia's most famous line from this case
he stated, "it is almost certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can
conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress.
Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."' 5'
The preceding cases referred to the protections provided under Title IX and
similar statutes. Looking solely at these statutes, however, does not provide a
complete background. Agency regulations are vital to understanding Title IX and
how it applies to third-party retaliation claims. Under Title IX, the responsibility
of "effectuat[ing]" the statute falls on the federal agencies providing the financial
funds.' 52 The agencies charged with providing financial funds carried out this
task, adopting a multitude of regulations to effectuate Title IX.' 53 These regulations include a prohibition on retaliation. 154 Specifically, the regulation states that
"[n]o recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate
against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege
secured by [Title IX], or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
" 155
part.
Important to the analysis of any agency regulation is the case of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This case established the
principle that courts must defer to agency rules when interpreting an ambigu-

147Id. at

288; see also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006).
U.S. at 289.

148Sandoval, 532
149Id. at
50

1

289-90.

Id.at 290-91.

151 Id.

at 291.

152Title

IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2006); see also Elizabeth

Y. McCuskey, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education: Title IX Implied PrivateRight ofAction
for Retaliation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 143, 148 (2006).
153
See

34 C.ER. % 106-106.71 (2006).
1'4
See id. at § 106.71 (incorporating Title VI regulation against retaliation 34 C.F.R. §
100.7(e)).
155
34 C.ER. § 100.7(e) (2006).
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ous statute. 15 6 It established a two-part analysis to determine whether a court
should defer to an agency regulation. 5 7 The first question that a court must
ask is whether Congress has clearly spoken on the issue. 5 8 If it has, that is "the
end of the matter."' 59 If Congress has not addressed the issue, or the statute is
ambiguous, the court does not "impose its own construction on the statute." 160
Rather, the court must determine whether the agency's solution is "based on a
permissible construction of the statute."' 16' The Court held that statutes enacted
by Congress create agency power, and agencies have the responsibility of filling
any gaps-through rules and regulations-that Congress has left.' 62 If a gap is
explicitly left in a statute for an agency to fill, the agency regulations are "given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute."'' 63 In Chevron, the Court deferred to the EPA's interpretation of the
Clean Air Act because the statute was ambiguous and the agency's interpretation
' 64
and subsequent rules were a "permissible construction of the statute."'
Title IX is an expansive statute that the Court has, with limited exceptions,
continually interpreted broadly. 65 Although these cases assist in determining the
outcome in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, agency regulations also
play a role in determining whether Title IX implies a private right of action for
third-party retaliation claims. Understanding Title IX's background is critical in
understanding the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent in Jackson.
PRINCIPAL CASE

The Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education in a
5-4 decision. It held that Title IX implies a private cause of action for third-party
66
retaliation, and allowed Jackson's claim against the school board to proceed.
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, and Justice Thomas wrote the dis167
sent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and justices Scalia and Kennedy.
156 Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

This case was based on Environmental Protection Agency regulations under the Clean Air Act. Id.
at 839-40.
157
Id.at 842-43.
158Id. at 842.

159Id. at 842-43.
160Id.

161
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
162 Id.

163Id.at 843-44.

164
Id.at 866.
165See supra notes 84-135 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 62-66 and accompanying

text.
166
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 184 (2005).
167 Id.
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The Jackson Court articulated three major reasons for its decision. The first
was that Title IX's text explicitly prohibits retaliation against those who complain of sex discrimination.68 It held that retaliation against a person based 1on69
complaints of sex discrimination is a form of "intentional sex discrimination."
Explaining this theory, the majority expressed that "[r]etaliation is, by definition,
an intentional act. It is a form of 'discrimination' because the complainant is being
subjected to differential treatment." 170 Therefore, retaliation is a form of sex discrimination because "it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint:
17
an allegation of sex discrimination." 1
The majority next asserted that Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. provided
the legal context for Title IX. 172 The Court decided Sullivan shortly before
Congress enacted Title IX.' 73 Congress was, therefore, aware of the Court's decision to interpret "a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover retaliation
74
against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition."
Just as the Court explained in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the legislature
expected the courts to interpret statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in the
to
same way that Sullivan was decided. 175 This meant interpreting these statutes
76
prohibit retaliation based on third-party complaints of discrimination.1
The Court based its final contention on policy: Title IX would become unen77
forceable if it allowed retaliation against those who complain about violations.
If retaliation were not prohibited, those who witness discrimination would be
less likely to report it. 178 "Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to
Title IX enforcement .... 179 If people in a position to report such abuse are
discouraged from doing so, the entire "enforcement scheme" of Title IX would
be undermined. 80 The Court pointed out that without embracing prohibitions
on retaliation, Congress' intent would be subverted. 8' Congress could not have

168

69

'

170

Id. at 173-78.

d. at 173.
Id.

171
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174.
172

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969);Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176-77.

173Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176.
174Id.

75Id.; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176-77.

176

'7 7 d. at 180-81.
178 Id.
179Id.

18 Id.at 181.
181Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181.
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intended to allow retaliation against those trying to protect the integrity of Title
IX.

18 2

Contrary to the majority, the dissent was adamant that a private right of action
should not be implied when Congress has not explicitly provided for one. The
dissent's first contention was that Title IX's text does not prohibit claims based
solely on retaliation. 8 3Title IX claims are permitted only when sex discrimination
occurs.'84 Justice Thomas reasoned that Title IX prohibits discrimination "on the
basis of the plaintiff's sex, not the sex of some other person."' 85 Because Jackson
was not discriminated against because of his own sex, the dissent reasoned, he
86
should not be permitted to bring a retaliation action.
Justice Thomas's second contention was that institutions receiving federal
funds were not on notice that they may be liable for acts of retaliation against
complaining employees. 87 The Board agreed to comply with statutory conditions
in exchange for federal funding, but the contract was ambiguous about whether
the Board would be subject to liability based on retaliation.' 88 Therefore, the
district should not be held liable without notice. 8 9
Finally, the dissent contended that Title IX does not clearly show Congress'
intent to create a private right of action for third-party retaliation claims.' 9
By imposing liability on entities for retaliation, the statute would be expanded
beyond its scope.' 91 It was persuasive, stated Justice Thomas, that Title IX does
192
not explicitly provide for retaliation claims when similar statutes do.
ANALYSIS

Ultimately, the Court accurately concluded that Title IX includes private
rights of action for third-party retaliation claims. But the majority could have
employed additional persuasive arguments. One of the majority's most convincing
lines of reasoning was its comparison of Jackson v. Birmingham Board ofEducation

182

Id.

183Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

84Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'85 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186

Id.at 187 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

187Id.at 190-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188Jackson, 544 U.S. at 191 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

9Id. at 191 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'9o
Id.at 193 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191
Id.at 194-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192 Id.

at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc."9 ' The majority's policy reasoning was
also persuasive. 194 There were three key arguments that the majority could have
used, however, that would have created a more compelling opinion. The first of
these was included in the dissent. The dissent compared Title IX to Title VII and
ultimately used this as a reason why retaliation should not be included in the
Title IX prohibitions.95 This was an erroneous contention. Second, the majority
also refrained from using agency regulations to strengthen its opinion.196 Third,
the Court neglected to use the four-part Cort test to determine whether a private
right of action should be implied.1 97 The Court declined to utilize these three
important arguments. Had the majority done so, it would have created a more
comprehensive opinion.

The Plain Text of Title IX Does Not Include Prohibitionson Retaliation
The majority began its opinion by asserting that the text of Title IX included
prohibitions on retaliation.198 On this point, however, the dissent had the stronger
argument.' 99 Justice Thomas pointed out that prohibitions on retaliation are not
explicitly stated in the text of Title IX.z° ° Title IX prohibits discrimination only
on the "basis of sex." 2 1' The majority attempted to cajole this small phrase to
encompass those who complain about discrimination that occurred on the basis
of another person's sex. 212 The majority also pointed to Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, which held that Title IX covered forms of "intentional discrimination." 20 3 Although Jackson was subjected to "intentional discrimination,"
the Court stretched the language of the Title IX too far when it claimed that
193

See infra notes 220-229 and accompanying text for an analysis of Sullivan and how it

compares to Jackson.
'94 See infra notes 209-219 and accompanying text for a discussion of policy reasons behind
this decision.
'15See infra notes 230-243 and accompanying text for a comparison of Title IX and Title VII.
"9' See infra notes 244-261 and accompanying text for a discussion of the anti-retaliation
regulations adopted by the Department of Education and the Department of Justice.
197 See infra notes 262-273 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four-part Cort test
and how it applies in this case.
19Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-78.
199See id. at 185-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The

Meaning ofSex: Jackson v. Birmingham School Board and it PotentialImplications, 198 W EDUC. L.
REP.

777, 792.
2

G°Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185.

201Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
202jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74.
203Id. at

173-74; see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).

An intentional act is defined as "[a] n act [that] is foreseen and desired by the doer, and this foresight
and desire resulted in the act through the operation of will." BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONRaY 26 (8th ed.
2004). Retaliatory acts are "foreseen and desired by the doer." Id. When an entity such as the school
district acts in retaliation of another, it is "foreseen and desired" because this entity is attempting to
"repay an injury" that has been paid upon it possibly through complaints of sex discrimination. Id.
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Jackson was discriminated against "on the basis of sex. ' 20 4 The majority based this
assertion on the fact that retaliation "is an intentional response to the nature of
the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination. '2° 5 Jackson, however, did not
experience discrimination on the basis of his sex. 20 6 Rather, the Board retaliated
against him because he complained of discrimination that occurred because of his
basketball players' sex. 20 7 It was not imperative, and may have been damaging, for
28
the majority to include this reasoning.

The Policy Considerationsof Title IX Callfor ProtectionAgainst Retaliation
The majority also reasoned that if retaliation were not covered under Title
IX, the statute would become ineffective.2 °9 As pointed out, "if retaliation were
not prohibited, Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel.1210 The dissent
reasoned that students and parents are also able to report incidents of Title IX
violations without the risk of retaliation. 21 But this is not entirely true. Often
students subjected to discrimination are reluctant to report abuse because of a fear
that retaliation will occur. 21 2 Contrary to the dissent's argument, students who
experience violations of Title IX are not in a position of power when it comes to
reporting these violations. 213 In fact, research has shown that "low-power persons
are particularly susceptible to retaliation. '2 4 In the hierarchy of a school, students
are at the bottom when it comes to power. 2 5 This means that students are the

204Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74; see also Russo & Thro, supra note 199, at 792; andReply Brief
of Petitioner at 6-7, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672).
20.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 204, at 6-7.
..Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
207 d.
208

See, e.g., Russo & Thro, supra note 199, at 792.

209

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81; see also Cassandra M. Hausrath, Note, Jackson v. Birmingham

Board of Education: Expanding the Class of the Protected,or Protecting the Protectors?,40 U. RICH.
L. REv. 613, 627 (2006) ("[P]rotection against retaliation is potentially critical to protection from
discrimination in the first place.").
21Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180.
2 11

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 195 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

212 See, e.g., Brake, supra note 123, at 26 ("Research in social psychology has documented a

marked reluctance among the targets of discrimination to label and confront their experiences as
such.") This is especially true when students are sexually harassed. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 278 (1998) (concluding student did not report sexual harassment
by a teacher because "she was uncertain how to react").
213 See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278 (even students who reported sexual harassment were not
taken seriously, and steps were never taken to remedy the abuses committed by the teacher); see also
Brief of the National Education Association et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4,
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672 (Aug. 19, 2004).
214 See Brake, supra note 123, at 39-40.
215 See, e.g., Brief of the National Education Association et al., supra note 213, at 4.
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most likely to be retaliated against when reporting discrimination.2 16 Simply
reviewing the evidence shows that the dissent's contention that students are pow2 17
erful enough to report discrimination and avoid retaliation is entirely incorrect.
Because students are considered inferior in the school setting, teachers are in the
best position to report abuse because they have more power." 8 Therefore, they
must be protected from retaliation for taking steps to remedy the violations. 9

The Legal Context of Title IX Callsfor ProtectionAgainst Retaliation
Also important to the majority's opinion was the case of Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc. which provided the legal context of Title IX.220 Because this
case provided the legal context of Title IX, it also created a strong precedent for
Jackson.22 1 When stripped to their most elemental, Jackson and Sullivan are virtually identical.222 Because these cases' facts are so similar the outcome should be
equally similar. 223 In Sullivan, a white man was retaliated against for protesting
statutory violations made against a black man. 224 Similarly, in Jackson, a male basketball coach was retaliated against for protesting illegal discrimination against a
girls basketball team. 225 In both cases, the people who were retaliated against complained of violations of anti-discrimination statutes designed to protect a certain
class of people.226 Although these cases are very similar, there are also differences
that must be addressed. Most noteworthy is the fact that these are two different
statutes that call for prohibitions on two different forms of discrimination.227 Title
216 See

id.

See id. at 4.

217
2 18

See McCuskey, supra note 152, at 160; see also Brief of Women's Sports Foundation as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17-18, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672 (Aug.
19, 2004).
219 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181.
220 Id. at 176. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. was decided under federal statute § 1982. See

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
221 Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4-5,
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672).
222 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Both cases involve a third person not protected by the text of the statute
advocating for the rights of persons who are part of the protected class. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at
234-37 andJackson 544 U.S. at 171-73. Both cases also involve the advocate being retaliated against
because of his complaints on behalf of a person or people protected by an anti-discrimination
statute. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234-37 andJackson, 544 U.S. at 171-73.
223 CompareJackson, 544 U.S. 167 with Sullivan, 396 U.S. 229.
224Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235.
225 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-72.
226

Id. at 173; Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235.

227 Compare Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (pro-

hibiting discrimination on the basis of sex) with Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of land ownership).
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IX calls for a prohibition on sex discrimination committed by federally funded
institutions. 228 The statute used in Sullivan calls for a prohibition on discrimination based on land ownership. 229 Although these statutes are different, they are
both attempting to prohibit the same conduct: discrimination.

The Dissent's Comparison of Title IX and Title VII Was Misplaced
Although some of the majority's reasoning was convincing, there were some
key points that could have been utilized to create a more complete opinion. The
first of these points is based on one of the dissent's arguments which compared
Title VII to Title IX and used this as a reason for denying private rights of action
for retaliation claims under Title IX.2 3 ° Justice Thomas was misleading when he
reasoned that if Congress wanted a Title IX private right of action for retaliation,
it should have explicitly included such a right in the legislation.2 3 ' He compared
Title VII to Title IX to support his contention. 23 When Congress enacted Title
VII, it explicitly provided for a private right of action for retaliation in the statute,
but did not in Title IX.233 The dissent reasoned that this illustrated Congress'
intent, stating that "[i]f a prohibition on 'discrimination' plainly encompasses
retaliation, the explicit reference to it in .. .Title VII, would be superfluous-a
result we eschew in statutory interpretation. The better explanation is that when
Congress intends to include a prohibition against retaliation in a statute, it does
so. "234

235
The Court should be wary, however, when comparing Title VII to Title IX.
These statutes were enacted according to two different Congressional powers.
Title VII should be narrowly construed while Title IX should have a broader
reach. 236 Congress enacted Title VII using "its general constitutional authority
under the Commerce Clause. '237 Conversely, Congress enacted Title IX under the

22' Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
229

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).

211Jackson, 544 U.S. at 189-90 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
231Id. at 189 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232Id. (Thomas, J.,dissenting); see also Kenneth L. Thomas & Ramadanah M. Salaam, The

Face of Title IX Post-Jackson v. BirminghamBoard ofEducation, 66 ALA. LAw. 429, 434 (2005).
233 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006);Jackson, 544 U.S.
at 189 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234Jackson, 544 U.S. at 190 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Thomas & Salaam, supra note
232, at 434.
235 Mank, supra note 18, at 85.
236

Id.at 88.

237

Id. at 87; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3 (stating that Congress has the power "[t]o

regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes").
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Spending Clause.2 3 Because Title VII was enacted under the Commerce Clause,
it applies to all employers affecting interstate commerce 3 9 Title VII is not voluntary.2 40 Instead, if an employer is "above a certain size" and "in the private labor
market," Title VII applies.24' Title IX, in contrast, only applies to entities that opt
to use federal educational funding.242 Because Title VII applies to a wider range of
entities,
there is a good policy reason for construing it more narrowly than Title
24 3
IX.

Agency Regulations ProhibitDiscriminationunder Title IX
The Court also neglected to address agency regulations that prohibit retaliatory conduct under Title IX.244 This reasoning could have lent additional support
to the majority opinion. Although the Court previously determined in Alexander
v.Sandoval that an agency's power in creating a private right of action was limited,
this does not mean that agencies do not have substantial room to define those
rights created by congressional statute or interpreted by the courts.2 45 Indeed,
while Sandoval "may prevent agencies from creating private rights of action by
themselves, they can achieve much the same effect by expansively interpreting
the statutory rights of action created by Congress. 2 46 In Cannon v. University of
Chicago, the Court determined that private rights of action were available under
Title IX for acts of intentional discrimination. 247 The majority failed to consider in
Jackson that the anti-retaliation regulation could be applied under the "intentional
discrimination" ban. 248 Although the HEW promulgated its rule against retaliation

238

See Mank, supra note 18, at 87; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1 (stating that Congress

has the power to "collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States").
239See Mank, supra note 18, at 87. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ......
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
240 See Mank, supra note 18, at 89.
141Id.

at 88-89.

242 Id. at

89.

243 Id. at 88. Because Title VII applies to a wider range of entities, it is important to narrowly

construe the statute to ensure that all entities are aware of the standards to which they will be held.
Id.
244Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-84.
245 SeeAlexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); see also Brianne J. Gorod, Comment, The
Sorcerer'sApprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of Action, 113
YALE L. J. 939, 940 (2004).
246 See Gorod, supra note 245, at 940.
247 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
248See Gorod, supra note 245, at 943.
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before Cannon, when the HEW was dismantled the agencies that inherited the
responsibility for effectuating Title IX did not adopt the anti-retaliation regulation
until after Cannon.24 9 This means that the agencies could have implicitly adopted
the anti-retaliation regulation by applying Title IX's prohibition on intentional
discrimination. 2 0 If this is the case, then the anti-retaliation regulation did not
create a new private right of action, as prohibited by Sandoval, rather, the agency
21
was simply interpreting retaliation to be a form of intentional discrimination.
The Court in Sandoval stated that "[w]e do not doubt that regulations applying
[Title IX's] ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action
to enforce [Title IX]. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively
252
construe the statute itself."

Given that the agency could have been applying Title IX's ban on intentional
discrimination, the only question left is whether the regulation is valid and reasonable. 253 To determine whether an agency's regulation is "valid and reasonable,"
the Court must use the Chevron analysis. 254 According to the Chevron doctrine
courts should defer to an executive agency's regulations when Congress's intent
is unclear or ambiguous. 255 In using Chevron's two-part test, the Court must first

determine whether Congress's intent is clear. 256 As here, when Congress's intent
is ambiguous concerning whether retaliation is to be protected under Title IX,
Chevron requires the Court to determine "whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute."' 257 The agencies' regulation states that

"[n]o recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate
against any individual .. .because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted,
258
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.
See Perez, supra note 37, at 1149. In 1979, the HEW was dismantled. Id. at 1150. This
led to the creation of the Department of Education, which was given the enforcement authority of
Title IX. Id.
250See Gorod, supra note 245, at 943.
251 Id. The Court in Sandoval prohibited agencies from creating private rights of action under
§ 602 ofTitle VI. Id. This is the section that empowers the appointed agency to create regulations
interpreting Title VI. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006). The
Sandoval decision, however, did not apply to § 601 of Title VI. See Gorod, supra note 245, at 943.
This section prohibits intentional discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
252 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284.
253 See id
254 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
249

255Id; see supra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.
256 Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842-43.

257Id.
258 34 C.ER. § 100.7(e) (2006). This regulation has been adopted by all three agencies
(Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of
Justice) given the power to effectuate Title IX by incorporating Title VI's regulation against retaliation. See 34 C.ER. § 106.71 (2006).
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The interpretation was reasonable when it prohibited retaliation. 2" "[I] t is neither
inconsistent with the text of [Title IX] nor an unreasonable construction of that
section for an agency to construe it to cover those who are purposefully injured
for opposing the intentional discrimination Congress made unlawful via [Title
IX]. 2 60 Given that the agencies' regulation is permissible under the statute, the
26 1
Court should give this regulation the deference that is called for under Chevron.
Because the Court neglected to address agency regulations prohibiting retaliatory
conduct, an opportunity to expand its opinion was lost.
The Cort Test Callsfor a Private Right ofAction
Another line of reasoning that the Court clearly neglected to consider is the
test pronounced in Cort v. Ash.262 The Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash established
a four-part test to determine when courts should imply a private right of action
when it is not explicitly called for by Congress. 263 The Court first utilized this test
to determine that a private right of action should be applied to people subjected
to discrimination in violation of Title IX.2c6 Although Jackson comes nearly 30
years after the Court determined that a private right of action exists under Title
IX,this case created an opportunity for the Court to revisit this test. Although the
Cort test is a four-part test, the only factor that would be in dispute in this case is
the first. Therefore, this is the only factor addressed here.265
The first factor in the Cort test is whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 266 The Court's analysis in Cannon
v.University of Chicago is telling on this point, however. In a footnote of that case,
the Court asserted, "the right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause
of action. ' 267 The Court then cited the case of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park to

259

Johnson v. Galen Health Inst., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679, 698 (2003).

260

Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 318 (2003).

261

Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.

262

See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

263

Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.

261See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that a private right of action
should be implied for victims of discrimination that violates Title IX).
265 Congress's review and approval of administrative regulations against retaliation shows

its intent to create a remedy for victims, satisfying the second factor. See supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text. For the third factor, protecting those trying to remedy discrimination fulfills
Title IX's purpose. TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 21, at 16; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
The Court previously recognized that the federal government has historically been the primary
protector "against invidious discrimination of any sort, including that on the basis of sex," satisfying
the fourth factor. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708.
266Cort, 422 U.S. at 67.
267 Cannon, 441

U.S. at 691 n.13.
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support this statement. 268 The facts of Jackson, as discussed above, are very similar
to the case of Sullivan v. Little HuntingPark.2 69 That the Court used Sullivan to
illustrate its point supports the contention that Jackson was a member of the class
whose especial benefit the statute was designed to protect.270
Even if the reasoning based on Cannon is not dispositive to prove the first
factor of the Cort test, the Court's own reasoning in this case is. As noted earlier,
the Court asserted that the retaliation that Jackson experienced was discrimination "on the basis of sex. '271 However disingenuous this reasoning seemed, the
Supreme Court is still the highest court in this country. Therefore, relying on its
language is not in fact disingenuous. Because the Court interpreted the retaliation
experienced by Jackson as discrimination "on the basis of sex," the first factor of
the Cort test is fulfilled.
In 1975, the Supreme Court announced that this was the test to be used
when determining whether a private right of action exists when Congress does
not explicitly provide for one.272 The majority in Jackson, however, declined to
utilize this test to strengthen its opinion. The reason for this is not clear. Although
the first factor would ordinarily be difficult to prove, the majority's opinion that
Jackson was discriminated "on the basis of sex" fits perfectly into the argument
that Jackson fulfilled the first factor of the Cort test. 273 The majority had the
opportunity to revisit and reaffirm this test, but ultimately it decided against
using a very convincing argument.
Jackson's Ramifications
The Court's decision in this case will significantly affect all educational
programs. An educational institution receiving federal assistance directly through
grants, loans, and even federal property will be subject to private actions if it
retaliates against a person reporting Title IX violations. 274 Not only will institutions receiving federal assistance directly be subject to this decision, but also educational institutions receiving federal funds indirectly through their students.275
This decision reaches almost every educational institution in the country.

268

Id.

269

See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.

270

See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.

271See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
272

Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.

273 See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
274

See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.

275 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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Not only are the majority of institutions subject to this decision, so is every
facet of the educational institution. 276 This includes retaliation that occurs for
reporting violations of Title IX in housing, access to course offerings, access
to schools, counseling, financial assistance, health and insurance benefits and
athletics. 277 Even the most mundane act of retaliation could subject the entire
educational institution to a lawsuit.
The decision in this case affects the application of Title IX in the future, but
it will also affect other statutes. As noted earlier, Title IX was patterned after Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.278 Historically, courts have interpreted these
statutes interchangeably. 279 Thus, the interpretation of Title IX in the Jackson
decision is bound to find its way into a Title VI case.
Although Title VI will obviously be affected by this decision, courts have cited
Jackson favorably when interpreting other statutes as well.28 The Jackson decision
is now used as a justification for implying private rights of action in third-party
retaliation claims for a number of cases.28' The astonishing thing about many of
282
these cases is the fact that some of the statutes involved are not even federal.
States are now using the Jackson decision to bolster their opinions when private
rights of action are implied under their own laws. Although there are decisions
both citing and approving of the decision in Jackson, this is still a relatively new
case. There is no way to predict what kind of impactJackson will continue to have
in courts throughout the country.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court came to the correct conclusion when
it decided in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education that Title IX provides a
private right of action for claims of third-party retaliation. The Court asserted
three reasons for its decision. First, it concluded that the plain text of Title IX
include claims of retaliation because the term "on the basis of sex" covers those
who complain about discrimination on the basis of another person's sex. This line

276

See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.

277 See supra note
278

47 and accompanying text.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

279See Alexander

v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001); andGebser v. Lago Vista Independent

Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998); see also North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514
(1982) andCannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979).
280See Humphries v. CBOCS, No. 05-4047 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2007); see also Taylor v. City of Los
Angeles, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1240 (2006) (involving the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act) and Yanowitz v. IjOreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1043 (2005) (involving the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
281 Id.
282See Taylor, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1240; see also Yanowitz, Cal. 4th at 1043.
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of reasoning, however, was not convincing. Second, the majority determined that
the policy behind Title IX requires private rights of action for third-party retaliation claims. This was an especially persuasive argument. Title IX's protections
could not be realized unless the protectors were shielded from retaliation. Finally,
the Court reasoned that the legal context in which Title IX was passed provides
proof that Congress intended Title IX to cover private third-party retaliation
claims.
While the Court's reasoning was convincing in some respects, there were
three major-but never articulated-arguments that could have significantly
bolstered the opinion. First, the Court should have rebutted the dissent's contention that, because Title VII specifically calls for protection against retaliation and
Title IX does not, this means that retaliation is not covered under Title IX. This
argument was erroneous and the majority could have pounced on it. Second, the
majority neglected to make any arguments based on Title IX regulations. There is
a specific regulation that prohibits retaliation that, if used, would have made for
a more complete opinion. Finally, the Court overlooked the four-part Cort test
that it had previously used to determine when to imply rights of action. Given the
major ramifications of this decision, a more thorough and convincing analysis was
appropriate.
It is still unclear how Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education will impact
future litigation. Some see this decision as a form of judicial legislation.28 3 Others
see this decision as right and natural given Title IX's long history.284 Whether one
views this decision as right or wrong, it is now clear that institutions receiving
federal funding are on notice that they are at risk of losing federal funding if they
retaliate against someone who has reported Title IX violations. No longer can
federally-funded institutions claim that Congress did not give proper notice that
they may be held liable. It would be prudent for practitioners-especially those
representing federally funded institutions-to make clear that the courts will not
tolerate retaliation.

283 See

Thomas & Salaam, supra note 232, at 434; see also Russo & Thro, supra note 199, at

790.
284See John A. Gray, Is Whistleblowing Protection Available Under Title IX?: An Hermeneutical

Divide and the Role of the Courts, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 671, 695-97 (2006); see also
Hausrath, supra note 209, at 628-30; and McCuskey, supra note 152, at 163-64; Perez, supra note
37, at 1173; Mank, supra note 18, at 106-07.
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